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Abstract 
The protection of information technology (IT) has become and is predicted to remain a 
key economic challenge for organizations. While research on IT security investment is 
fast growing, it lacks a theoretical basis for structuring research, explaining economic-
technological phenomena and guide future research. We address this shortcoming by 
suggesting a new theoretical model emerging from a multi-theoretical perspective adopt-
ing the Resource-Based View and the Organizational Learning Theory. The joint appli-
cation of these theories allows to conceptualize in one theoretical model the organiza-
tional learning effects that occur when the protection of organizational resources through 
IT security countermeasures develops over time. We use this model of IT security invest-
ments to synthesize findings of a large body of literature and to derive research gaps. We 
also discuss managerial implications of (closing) these gaps by providing practical ex-
amples. 
Keywords:  Information Security, Investment, Literature review, Resource-based View, Organi-
zational Learning Theory, Multi-theoretical Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi-Theoretical Literature Review on Information Security Investments 
  
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 2 
Introduction  
The protection of information technology (IT) has become and is predicted to remain a key challenge for 
organizations, which need to secure their IT systems, data, intellectual property, and business processes 
against attacks, misuse or technical failures (Anderson 2001; Frost & Sullivan 2013; Gartner 2011, 2012; 
Whitman 2003). IT threats can lead, for example, to the disruption of production and service processes 
(e.g., attack on MasterCard and Visa (The Guardian 2010)) and data theft (e.g., attack on Sony Pictures 
Entertainment (The Washington Post 2014)), which, in turn, result in economic damage, including losses 
in productivity and revenue, strategic disadvantages and loss of reputation (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2009). 
Many security incidents are attributable to cybercrime, which can be considered a growth industry (McAfee 
2014). 
Industries have responded to emerging IT security threats with high investments in IT security. According 
to Gartner (2014), the worldwide spending on IT security reached $71.1 billion in 2014, an increase of 7.9 
percent over one year, and is expected to grow further 8.2 percent in 2015. A recent survey indicates that 
organizations will spend an average of $381 per employee on IT security (eWEEK 2014). In the 2016 budget 
proposal of the U.S. government, $14 billion are reserved for cybersecurity efforts to protect federal and 
private networks (Thomson Reuters 2015). These figures indicate that the IT security landscape is pervaded 
not only by technological challenges but also by financial issues. In the presence of budget constraints, key 
economic questions for organizations are which of their assets (processes, systems, etc.) need which level 
of protection, which security countermeasures (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection systems, security educa-
tion, or security policies) lead to this protection and how much should be spent on which countermeasure 
(Anderson and Schneier 2005; Gordon and Loeb 2006). 
IT security researchers have responded to the economic challenges of IT security with hundreds of articles. 
A broad set of approaches from different disciplines, including micro-economics (e.g., Grossklags et al. 
(2008a), finance (e.g., Buck et al. (2008)), risk management (e.g., Hoo (2000)) and organization theory 
(e.g., Cohen (2006)) have been applied. However, the literature is still rather fragmented, and incoherent 
based on the isolated adoption of different approaches and lacks a unifying theoretical basis.   
In order to address these deficiencies, we ask three research questions: 
1. Why and how can a multi-theoretical perspective based on the “Resource-based View” and the “Or-
ganizational Learning Theory” be used to structure and guide research on information security in-
vestments? 
2. To what extent has the literature contributed to key questions of information security investments? 
3. What are gaps in information security investments research that still need to be addressed? 
Our approach to draw on the widely accepted “Resource-based View” and the “Organizational Learning 
Theory” is driven by the goal to address both the static and dynamic (temporal) protection of an organiza-
tion’s resources at the firm level. Adopting only one theory necessarily leads to the neglect of either the 
static or the dynamic perspective. We use this multi-theoretical perspective to suggest a new theoretical 
model on information security investments. Our synthesis of literature findings is structured according to 
this model, which also allows us to identify research gaps. Adopting the typology of literature reviews sug-
gested by Paré et al. (2015, p. 186), we conduct a “theoretical review”. 
With our literature review, we contribute to the literature on information security investments in several 
regards: (1) to the best of our knowledge, we provide the first multi-perspective theoretical model on infor-
mation security investments; (2) we comprehensively synthesize literature findings using the theoretical 
model; (3) we identify research gaps to guide future research.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the following section, we provide a brief introduc-
tion to information security investment research. In Section 3, we present a multi-theoretical view by dis-
cussing the Resource-based View and the Organizational Learning Theory and we suggest an integrative 
model on information security investments. The literature search and selection is described in Section 4. 
Section 5 synthesizes the literature and identifies research gaps, before we discuss our results in Section 6. 
We conclude our paper in Section 7.  
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Information Security Investment Research 
Effectiveness and economic efficiency of information security investments has been an important research 
topic for a long time (Kwon and Johnson 2014). Currently, there are three interdisciplinary streams of re-
search related to information security investments: (1) Micro-economic approaches based on game theory 
(e.g., Grossklags et al. (2008a) and Sun et al. (2008)); (2) Financial analysis based on Return on Investment 
(ROI), Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (e.g., Bojanc and Jerman-Blažic (2008a) 
and Buck et al. (2008)); and (3) Management approaches based on decision theory (e.g., Huang and Goo 
(2009)), risk management (e.g., Bojanc and Jerman-Blažic (2008b) and Hoo (2000)) and organization 
theory (e.g., Cohen (2006) and Hagen et al. (2008)). In this article, we propose a multi-theoretical model 
that allows us to embed the literature on the three current research streams into a comprehensive model 
based on the Resource-based View and the Organizational Learning Theory. For instance, game-theoretical 
articles, such as the paper of Grossklags et al. (2008a), deal with the influences of attacks on the firm’s 
decision to invest in security; these influences are covered in our model, more precisely in the Governing 
Variables. The proposed model extends the model proposed in Weishäupl et al. (2015) by considering the 
dynamic properties of information security.  
However, the development of a theoretical model for information security investments is a challenging task 
because (1) the nature of countermeasures is diverse, covering strategic and operational issues with regard 
to the legal, technical and organizational perspectives. (2) Unlike other investments, information security 
investments are not intended to earn a return, but to reduce risk, i.e., they are successful if “nothing hap-
pened” and thus the potential outcomes (benefits or loss) are often intangible (Kwon and Johnson 2014, p. 
452). Examples of intangible outcomes are benefits related to regulatory compliance and public credibility 
(Kwon and Johnson 2014). Investing into information security processes or products does not provide di-
rect return but it may have a positive impact on the organizational performance if it leads to a reduction of 
potential risks (Böhme and Nowey 2008). (3) The complementarity between the “ex-ante” and the “ex-post” 
perspectives must be taken into account. First, the approaches which adopt an “ex-ante” perspective aim at 
providing decision support by estimating the costs and benefits of possible investments (Böhme and Nowey 
2008). Second, approaches which adopt the “ex-post” perspective reflect on investments made in the past 
and evaluate whether the firm’s budget allocation was effective and efficient (Böhme and Nowey 2008).  
The first two of these challenges can be addressed by drawing on the Resource-based View because (a) 
diverse assets such as systems, data or processes, which need to be protected, can be modeled as resources 
and (b) both tangible and intangible resources, such as firewalls, and security knowledge, can be explicitly 
considered (Weishäupl et al. 2015). Organizational Learning Theory is particularly suitable to address the 
third challenge because it takes into account the firm’s ability to learn and integrate temporal and dynamic 
feedback loops.  
Overall, both the Resource-based View and the Organizational Learning Theory, which are established the-
ories in the IS literature (Kwon and Johnson 2014; Wade and Hulland 2004), provide an appropriate the-
oretical basis to frame research on information security investments. We apply both perspectives in the next 
section in order to suggest a multi-theoretical lens on information security investments, including the pro-
vision of an integrative theoretical model.  
A Multi-Theoretical Lens on Information Security Investments 
In this section, we first discuss the advantages of adopting a multi-theoretical view on information security 
investments. Then we apply the theoretical lenses (Resource-based View and Organizational Learning The-
ory) and show in which regard they are appropriate for framing information security investments. Finally, 
we develop a new theoretical foundation for information security investments by integrating both of these 
theoretical lenses.  
Multiple Lenses on Information Security Investments 
According to Schryen (2015), literature can be framed from different perspectives in order to provide com-
plementary views on the literature. The impact of drawing on multiple views is threefold: First, comple-
mentary views can be synthesized into a new theoretical model, which combines the advantages of multiple 
perspectives. Second, the interplay between multiple perspectives provides a more comprehensive account 
of the literature that can be used to classify studies. Third, a combined perspective gives rise to research 
questions which would otherwise have remained undetected. With regard to the IS literature, there are 
several articles which use multi-theoretical perspectives. For instance, Jasperson et al. (2002) analyze the 
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link between power on the one side and IT impacts or use on the other side with the help of technology 
lenses and power lenses. In the field of information security, Siponen et al. (2014) use the Protection Moti-
vation Theory, the Theory of Reasoned Action, and the Cognitive Evaluation Theory to explain employees’ 
adherence to security policies.  
In our study, we view the information security investment literature through two lenses: the Resource-
based View and the Organizational Learning Theory. These two lenses are suitable because they comple-
ment each other: (1) The Resource-based View is inherently static, focusing on the possession of resources 
and capabilities (Elsenhardt and Martin 2000; Kraaijenbrink et al. 2010). This means that it does not ac-
count for dynamics and temporal effects. In contrast, the Organizational Learning Theory considers such 
effects and theorizes on learning progress made from the organization’s past errors over time which ensures 
that an organization transforms ”information into valued knowledge which in turn increases its long-run 
adaptive capacity” (Schwandt and Marquardt 1999, p. 70). It thus enables an organization to react to dy-
namically changing environments. (2) The Resource-based View, as suggested by Melville et al. (2004), 
operationalizes and covers major factors (cf. Figure 1) which need to be considered in investment decisions 
(Weishäupl et al. 2015), for instance the macro, competitive and focal firm environment. An advantage of 
the Resource-based View is that it theorizes on various components of a firm, its environment and its rela-
tions to each other. In contrast, the Organizational Learning Theory does not focus on the organization and 
its components in detail.  
Therefore, we examine the information security investment literature using these two lenses simultaneously 
to suggest a new integrative theoretical model, to gain a comprehensive view on the literature and to identify 
corresponding and otherwise undetected research gaps.   
First Theoretical Lens: The Resource-Based View 
The origins of the Resource-based View, one of the most influential theories in the history of management 
theorizing (Kraaijenbrink et al. 2010), can be traced back to the works of Chandler (1977), Coase (1937), 
Penrose (1959), Stigler (1961) and Wernerfelt (1984). The key proposition is that a firm must acquire and 
control valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources and capabilities to achieve sustained 
competitive advantage (Barney 1991, 1994, 1997; Kraaijenbrink et al. 2010). According to Barney (1991, p. 
101), a firm’s resources include “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, infor-
mation, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies 
that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.  
According to Weishäupl et al. (2015), information security investments are a subtype of (general) IT invest-
ments and therefore the Resource-based View is appropriate for framing information security investments 
for three reasons: (1) Both, non-security IT resources or assets (IT systems, data, processes, etc.), which 
need protection, and IT security resources, which provide protection, can be modeled as resources, with 
both tangible resources, such as firewalls, and intangible resources, including security knowledge, being 
covered (Weishäupl et al. 2015). (2) The Resource-based View has been used in the IS literature to frame 
information security investments. For instance, Cavusoglu et al. (2004) draw on the Resource-based View 
to assess hypotheses related to organizational size, security breaches and discusses the Resource-based 
View’s link to security investments. Central elements of the Resource-based View can also be found in the 
work of Demirhan (2005). (3) The Resource-based View has already served as a theoretical basis for litera-
ture reviews in the IS domain, such as the “IT Business Value Model” of Melville et al. (2004). In the fol-
lowing, we draw on the Resource-based View, which was adapted to the information security investment 
context (Weishäupl et al. 2015), as shown in Figure 1 and described in Table 1.  
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Figure 1.  The Resource-based View on Information Security Investments based on  
(Melville et al. 2004; Weishäupl et al. 2015) 
 
In Figure 1, the relationships between constructs mean “may improve”. Impacts M1, C1 and C2 describe 
external factors which affect information security investment decisions of an organization. Country charac-
teristics such as the level of development or governmental regulations influence a firm’s information secu-
rity investment decisions, which is depicted by the impact M1. Competitiveness, regulation, technological 
change, and other industry-characteristic factors (C1) and trading partners, such as buyers and suppliers 
(C2), have impact on a firm’s decision to invest in information security.  
The impacts F1 to F10 express the effects of investment in various IT security resources within the focal 
firm. F1 relates to the effect of technological IT security resources on technological non-security IT re-
sources, such as investing into a firewall to protect non-security IT resources, e.g., data (e.g., Grossklags et 
al. (2008b), Jiang et al. (2008) and Torrellas and Vargas (2003)). As a significant number of security inci-
dents are caused by human and not by technical failures or intruders (Beautement et al. 2008), F2 addresses 
the impacts of human IT security resources on technological non-security IT resources. An example is that 
security workshops and trainings aim at the protection of data. Impact F3a is related to effects of human IT 
security resources on technological IT security resources (e.g., workshops on usage of intrusion detection 
systems influence the IDS) with F3b vice versa (e.g., systems that control file transfer warn employees and 
therefore train their awareness).  
Impact F4 relates to the effect of IT resources on complementary organizational resources, such as the 
building of a firm whose access may be protected by authentication systems (Liu and Silverman 2001). 
Investment in IT security resources and complementary organizational resources may improve business 
processes or enable new ones (impact F5). Impact F6 refers to the fact that information security processes 
are intended to protect business processes and their underlying resources (Neubauer and Heurix 2008; X. 
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Wang et al. 2008). The security processes are subtypes of business processes because “the process of secu-
rity is destined to fail if it does not protect the process of business” (Wattel 2002, p. 177). The effectivity of 
a security process is measured by means of a security process performance (impact F7). The security process 
performance has impact on the business process performance, which is a result of the relation business 
process to security process and is conceptualized as impact F8. The IT business value generation process, 
including resources, processes, business and security performances, impacts directly the organizational 
performance (impact F9). Impact F10 refers to the “direct link between IT and overall firm performance, 
bypassing the effect of IT on business processes” (Dehning and Richardson 2002, p. 9).  
 
Table 1. Definitions and Examples of Model Constructs of Figure 1  
(Weishäupl et al. 2015) 
Construct Definition and Example 
1. Focal Firm 
Resources:  
 IT resources:   
- Technological Hardware and software, e.g., shared technology and technology services 
across the enterprise, purchasing, sales, etc. (Melville et al. 2004) 
- Human  Technical and managerial IT skills, e.g., training, experience, knowledge, 
judgment, intelligence and relationships (Barney 1991) 
- Security Resources protecting other resources, e.g., firewall, intrusion detection sys-
tem, anti-virus software, authentication through biometric scan 
 Complementary Or-
ganizational Re-
sources 
Organizational and physical resources which are complementary to IT, e.g., 
policies, 
rules, organizational structure and culture (Melville et al. 2004) as well as 
workers, offices and equipment 
Processes:   
 Business Process Specific ordering of work activities and clearly identified inputs and outputs 
(Davenport 1993) , e.g., order taking, PC assembly, distribution (Melville et 
al. 2004) 
 Security Process Processes that help safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
a firm’s operations (Khansa and Liginlal 2009) 
Performances:   
 Business Process Per-
formance 
Operational efficiency of specific business processes (Melville et al. 2004), 
e.g., customer satisfaction (Devaraj and Kohli 2000), inventory turnover 
(Barua et al. 1995), gross margin and quality (Dehning and Richardson 2002) 
 Security Process Per-
formance 
Operational efficiency of security processes, e.g., Failure to Enroll (FTE), 
False Match Rate (FMR) in a biometric authentication system (OECD 2004) 
 Organizational Perfor-
mance 
Overall firm performance, including productivity, efficiency, profitability, 
market value, competitive advantage, etc. (Melville et al. 2004) 
2. Competitive Environment 
Industry Characteristics  Factors which affect the application of IT within the focal firm to generate 
business value, e.g., competitiveness, regulation, technological change 
(Melville et al. 2004) 
Trading Partner Re-
sources and Business 
Processes 
IT and non-IT resources and business processes of trading partners such as 
buyers and suppliers (Melville et al. 2004) 
3. Macro Environment 
Country Characteristics Macro factors shaping IT application and IT business value generation, e.g., 
level of development, basic infrastructure and culture (Melville et al. 2004) 
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Second Theoretical Lens: The Organizational Learning Theory 
With the increasing globalization and the accelerating dynamics of the competitive environment, organiza-
tions need to constantly improve their products and processes in order to generate and maintain competi-
tive advantage (Smith et al. 1996). The current interest in organizational learning among scholars and prac-
titioners reflects this new competitive field (Hamdan 2013; Smith et al. 1996).  
According to Argyris (1976, p. 365), learning is defined as “the detection and correction of errors, and error 
as any feature of knowledge or of knowing that makes action ineffective” and “the detection and correc-
tion of error produces learning and the lack of either or both inhibits learning”. Furthermore, complex 
and ill-structured problems tend to be more ambiguous and are associated with a higher rate of errors, 
which makes it difficult to implement effective plans and actions (Argyris 1976). As information security 
investments are such complex problems, they would benefit from the perspective of Organizational Learn-
ing Theory specifically because it describes how the effectiveness of decisions can be improved over time by 
taking into account past experiences in feedback-loops. Furthermore, Organizational Learning Theory pro-
vides a dynamic view which can be used to continuously analyze the effects of investments on the security 
level (Culnan and Williams 2009; Culnan et al. 2008; Kwon and Johnson 2014). Conceptually, influences 
which affect information security investment decisions can be modeled as governing variables, investments 
in IT security resources can be modeled as action strategies which result in consequences such as higher 
security awareness. 
We use the Organizational Learning Theory as suggested by Argyris et al. (1985) in the context of infor-
mation security investments (cf. Figure 2 and Table 2). Organizational learning is defined as a change in 
the organization’s knowledge because a firm gathers experience over time (cf. Argote (2011) and Fiol and 
Lyles (1985)). The model for Organizational Learning comprises three interconnected constructs: govern-
ing variables, action strategies and consequences. In conformance with the original model (Argyris et al. 
1985), relationships  are defined as “has impact on” (arrows in Figure 2):  
 
 
Figure 2.  Organizational Learning Theory based on Argyris et al. (1985) 
 
Governing variables (construct C1) are objectives a firm strives to achieve. As organizations align their ac-
tions with their objectives (Argyris et al. 1985), governing variables have an impact on information security 
investment decisions (impact I1). For instance, one objective might be the compliance with government and 
industry sector-specific regulations (Daneva 2006) such as the Clinger-Cohen-Act or the Federal Infor-
mation Security Management Act (FISMA).  
Action strategies (construct C2) are "sequences of moves" (Argyris et al. 1985) intended to fulfill certain 
objectives, as measured by the governing variables. In our case, action strategies are investments in IT se-
curity resources, such as the implementation of a firewall or an intrusion detection system.  
Action strategies effect consequences (impact I2). An example would be investments in security workshops 
which are expected to reduce security incidents caused by employees (Stephanou 2009). 
Consequences (construct C3) include all outcomes associated with information security investments 
whether they are intended or unintended, productive or counterproductive (Argyris et al. 1985). Conse-
quences might match the governing variables if the firm has chosen an appropriate action strategy. Exem-
plary consequences are reduction of security incidents or increase in service availability.   
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Impacts 3 (I3) and 4 (I4) are complementary learning opportunities which reflect how well a firm tries to 
evaluate its information security investment decisions.  
Impact I3 refers to single loop learning which comprises adjustments that are consistent with “the existing 
set of rules and norms” (Romme and Dillen 1997, p. 69), i.e., it does not involve changes to governing var-
iables (Argyris 1983). For example, single loop learning occurs if the consequence of an action strategy is a 
decline of security incidents and the firm evaluates the positive outcome to ensure that the chosen action 
strategy is the best without changing the governing variables.  
Impact I4 refers to the learning process which occurs in a double loop and involves modifications of “the 
fundamental rules and norms underlying action and behavior” (Argyris and Schön 1978; Romme and 
Dillen 1997, p. 69). Applied to the information security investment scenario, double loop learning occurs if 
the consequences of investment decisions do not satisfy the objectives and induce the firm to reevaluate the 
governing variables and invest differently. While single-loop learning is a general model of action, double 
loop learning provides “feedback and more effective decision making” (Argyris 1976, p. 363). However, 
“the overwhelming amount of learning done in an organization is single loop because it is designed to 
identify and correct errors so that the job gets done and the action remains within the stated guidelines” 
(Argyris 1977, p. 113).   
Note that the constructs C1 to C3 with the impacts I1 and I2 imply a temporal sequence whereas impacts I3 
and I4 describe two possibilities of evaluation and learning processes of a firm aiming to correct their po-
tential mistakes and to make more effective and efficient decisions in the future.    
 
Table 2. Model Constructs and Impacts in the Organizational Learning Theory  
(cf. Figure 2). 
No. Construct/Im-
pact 
Definition Example 
C1 Governing Varia-
bles 
Objectives a firm seeks to achieve 
(Argyris et al. 1985). 
Government and industry sector-
specific regulations such as SOX or 
HIPAA (Daneva 2006), a firm’s risk 
preference (Derrick Huang et al. 
2008).  
I1 Effect of Governing 
Variables on Action 
Strategies 
To be successful in terms of the 
governing variables, an organiza-
tion implements actions (Argyris et 
al. 1985). 
The firm strives to maintain a cer-
tain quality of service and invests in 
intrusion detection systems to pre-
vent denial of service attacks.  
C2 Action Strategies Sequences of moves used by actors 
in particular situations to keep the 
governing variables at a satisfactory 
level (Argyris et al. 1985).  
Investments in workshops, fire-
walls, encryption or access control 
techniques.  
I2 Effect of Action 
Strategies on Con-
sequences 
Actions have consequences for the 
organization’s effectiveness 
(Argyris et al. 1985).  
The investments in workshops on 
security results in fewer unintended 
security incidents caused by em-
ployees (Stephanou 2009).  
C3 Consequences Consequences of the strategies, in-
tended or unintended, productive 
or counterproductive (Argyris et al. 
1985).  
Reduction of security incidents in 
the internal network or increase in 
service availability.  
I3 Single Loop Learn-
ing 
When new action strategies are 
used in the framework of the same 
governing variables. A change in ac-
tion but not in the governing varia-
bles takes place (Argyris et al. 
1985).  
If investments in workshops effect a 
decline of unintended security inci-
dents, the firm will learn from the 
effectiveness and consider future in-
vestments in such trainings. 
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I4 Double Loop 
Learning  
Question and modify the governing 
variables according to the conse-
quences (Shen and Jones 2005). 
An organization adapts its invest-
ment strategy to changing environ-
mental factors, such as investing 
into an improved encryption system 
to counteract an increased occur-
rence of hacker attacks.  
 
An Integrative Model for Information Security Investments 
We integrate the Resource-based View as depicted in Figure 1 and the Organizational Learning Theory as 
shown in Figure 2 into a multi-theoretical model (see Figure 3) which preserves the advantages of both of 
the original theories: the integrative model accounts for the repeated reevaluation of information security 
investments by dynamically incorporating the feedback of single and double loop learning to adjust corre-
sponding action strategies. In addition, the integrative model frames firm-characteristic components such 
as business process and security resources - making it compliant with the established body of research on 
the Resource-based View.  
We merge the original theories in the following way: country characteristics, industry characteristics and 
trading partner resources and business processes influence firms in information security investment deci-
sion making; therefore, these factors are categorized as governing variables. Governing variables have an 
impact (impact 1 in Figure 3) on investment decisions in IT security resources which correspond to action 
strategies. For example, country-specific governmental regulations require certain investments to pass se-
curity audits (Ghose and Rajan 2006). Investments in technological or human IT security resources are 
associated with action strategies. This means, in particular, that investments in security training, education 
or awareness are part of the action strategies since they belong to human IT security resources. Note that 
only IT security resources are conceptualized as action strategies because we focus on investment in IT 
security in this article.  
Investments in IT security resources have an impact on consequences which is depicted by impact 2. The 
consequences include the impact investments have on non-security resources, security processes, security 
process performance and the overall organizational performance. Impacts 3 to 6 within the consequences 
are adopted from the Resource-based View. Note that the construct “Business Process” within the “Conse-
quences” refers to the business processes of the focal firm whereas the construct “Trading Partner Re-
sources & Business Processes” in the “Governing Variables” refers to the business process of the trading 
partners, which influence the IT security investment decisions of the focal firm and therefore are part of  
the “Governing Variables”.  
The single and double learning loops (impacts 7 and 8) are adopted from the Organizational Learning The-
ory; they represent feedback loops from the consequences to the governing variables and to the action strat-
egies.  
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Figure 3. An Integrative Model for Information Security Investments 
 
Definitions and examples of the impacts presented in Figure 3 are provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Impacts in the Integrative Model for Information Security Investments  
(cf. Figure 3) 
No. Impact Definition Example 
1 Effects of Governing 
Variables on Action 
Strategies  
Country Characteristics, Industry 
Characteristics, Trading Partner 
Resources and Business Processes 
influence a firm’s information se-
curity investment decisions 
(Melville et al. 2004; Weishäupl et 
al. 2015). 
SOX requires firms to invest in ad-
ditional IT security resources in or-
der to pass security audits (Ghose 
and Rajan 2006).  
2 Effects of Action 
Strategies on Conse-
quences 
Investments in IT Security Re-
sources (technological or human) 
have an impact on non-security IT 
resources, Complementary Organ-
izational Resources, processes and 
performances (Melville et al. 
2004; Weishäupl et al. 2015). 
Investments in a technological IT 
security resource, such as biomet-
rical authentication systems, affect 
non-security IT resources like data 
and hardware as it prevents unau-
thorized access to firm’s premises.  
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3 Effects of Security 
Processes on Business 
Processes 
Business Processes are constantly 
exposed to threats and need to run 
uninterruptedly to guarantee a 
company’s success (Neubauer and 
Heurix 2008; X. Wang et al. 2008; 
Weishäupl et al. 2015). 
Biometric authentication is a secu-
rity process which directly influ-
ences the business process be-
cause, if the authentication system 
breaks down, workflows are dis-
rupted (Weishäupl et al. 2015). 
4 Effects of Security 
Process on Security 
Process Performance  
The effectivity of a Security Pro-
cess is expressed by a Security Pro-
cess Performance.  
The number of true/false or posi-
tive/negative authentication at-
tempts measures the effectivity of 
an authentication system. 
5 Effects of Security 
Process Performance 
on Business Process 
Performance 
The Security Process Performance 
influences the Business Process 
Performance.  
A low number of false rejection of 
an authentication system assures 
an uninterrupted workflow.  
6 Effects of the IT Busi-
ness Value on the Or-
ganizational Perfor-
mance  
All resources, processes and per-
formances directly influence the 
overall firm’s performance 
(Melville et al. 2004).    
The efficiency and productivity of 
an organization increases when an 
organizational workflow is rarely 
interrupted and quickly recovered.  
7 Single Loop Learning: 
Effects of Conse-
quences on the Action 
Strategies  
When new Action Strategies are 
used in the service of the same 
Governing Variables. A change in 
action but not in the Governing 
Variables takes place (Argyris et al. 
1985). (cf. Table 2) 
If investments in workshops effect 
a decline of unintended security in-
cidents, the firm will learn from the 
effectiveness and consider future 
investments in such trainings. (cf. 
Table 2) 
8 Double Loop Learn-
ing: 
Effects of Conse-
quences on Governing 
Variables  
Question and modify the Govern-
ing Variables according to the Con-
sequences (Shen and Jones 2005). 
(cf. Table 2) 
An organization adapts its invest-
ment strategy to changing environ-
mental factors, such as investing 
into an improved encryption sys-
tem to counteract an increased oc-
currence of hacker attacks. (cf. Ta-
ble 2) 
 
Literature Search and Selection 
We followed the guidelines of Webster and Watson (2002) and implemented them by drawing on the steps 
suggested by Levy and Ellis (2006): 
Step 1. (Inputs): We conducted a database search, as suggested by vom Brocke et al. (2009), which cov-
ered ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, Ebsco Host Business Source Premier, Science 
Direct and the AIS Electronic Library. Articles were identified through scanning the abstracts using the 
following two logical search strings:  
 (invest* OR economic OR cost) AND (information OR “information technology” OR “information sys-
tems”) AND (“security process” OR (secure* AND (decision OR “ex ante” OR “ex post” OR evaluat* OR 
audit OR monitor OR metric OR “business process”)))  
 (financ* OR invest* OR cost OR economic) AND “security breach” AND effect,  
with “*” being the truncation symbol. We did not limit the period of time in our search. To complement our 
search, we queried the proceedings of the Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS) and 
Google Scholar. Finally, we conducted a backward search to identify further articles. We scanned the arti-
cles’ abstracts and removed articles which do not focus on economics of information security. For example, 
we excluded articles which  are purely technical (e.g., Bitter et al. (2010)) or which cover only management 
issues without considering investments in IT security (e.g., Chew (2008)).  
Step 2. (Processing): After reading the remaining papers, we coded them according to the relationships 
of our integrative model of information security investments shown in Figure 3. Assigning articles to these 
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impacts – some articles address more than one impact – is useful in order to synthesize literature findings 
in a concept-centric way as suggested by Webster and Watson (2002). The concept used in this literature 
review is the aforementioned model. 
Step 3. (Outputs): Due to page limitations, we cover the literature exhaustively but present only selected 
works, as described by Cooper (1988): for each of the relationships in our model of information security 
investments, we describe selected, exemplary works, which are representative for the findings related to the 
respective impact in the model.  
Synthesis and Identification of Research Gaps 
In this section, we synthesize the literature on information security investments according to our new model 
presented in Figure 3. Thus, our presentation is concept-centric as suggested by Webster and Watson 
(2002). From our synthesis we derive research questions for each of the impacts in Figure 3.  
Effects of Governing Variables on Action Strategies  
Governing variables such as country characteristics, industry characteristics, trading partner resources and 
business processes influence a firm’s information security investment decisions, i.e., their decision on how 
much to invest in which IT security resources (Melville et al. 2004; Weishäupl et al. 2015). Examples for 
country characteristics are the New Capital Accord (Basel II) (Locher 2005) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (GLBA) for financial firms, the SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley) act for accounting firms and the HIPAA (Khansa 
and Liginlal 2009) for healthcare provider. Few studies focus on investment decisions in security in the 
light of specific national conditions and regulations and some of them conclude, interestingly, that these 
regulations have negative impact on investment decisions. Ghose and Rajan (2006) examine the effect of 
regulatory compliance and information assurance on the optimal level of investments in information secu-
rity. For example, the authors find that the SOX act can have major consequences on market structure and 
on a firm’s competitive position, although this was unintended by policy makers (Ghose and Rajan 2006). 
In a recent study which analyzed regulations of HIPAA in the healthcare sector, external influences have 
been found to reduce the  impact of proactive investments on security performance (Kwon and Johnson 
2014). However, a positive side-effect of these regulatory initiatives is that they increase security awareness 
and draw attention to information security investment announcements (Chai et al. 2011). Best practice 
standards, such as ITIL, COBIT, and international standards, such as ISO/IEC 27002: 2013, also affect 
information security investment decisions. Another factor which influences security investment decisions 
is the level of development of the country, in which the firm operates because culture and education of the 
workforce determine the need for security workshops or training (Bose and Luo 2014; Connolly and Lang 
2013). 
Industry characteristics influence how IT is employed within a focal firm to create business value, including 
competitiveness, regulation and clock speed (Melville et al. 2004). In the context of information security, a 
crucial factor is the integration of IT security resources of a firm’s ongoing business operation and business 
environment which in fact means that a firm should aim at investing in IT security resources that are not 
only applicable in their enterprise IT architecture but also generate value (Weishäupl et al. 2015). The key 
challenge for a firm is thus a mixed balance between adoption of their IT security resources and the optimal 
investment into these which is, however, not covered by the academic literature.  
Finally, the impact of a firm’s trading partners with respect to information sharing and outsourcing needs 
to be considered. Sharing data on information security leads to decreased spending and increased levels of 
security since firms learn from the mistakes of other firms (Anderson et al. 2008; Gal-Or and Ghose 2005; 
Gordon et al. 2003; Landwehr 2004; Rowe 2007). There are good reasons for firms not to share their se-
curity-related data as these are often sensitive data, which include private data about the firm’s personnel 
and which gives indication about corporate secrets. The transfer of such sensitive data might be misused 
and can cause loss of reputation and trust, negative effects on the market value of the firm and signal of 
weakness to adversaries (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005). To avoid such damages, Gordon et al. (2003) recom-
mend to create financial incentives for information sharing which might be realized by legal regulation (Gal-
Or and Ghose 2005).  
Information outsourcing is becoming a more important subject due to the growing complexity of infor-
mation security management (Lacity et al. 2009, 2010). When firms outsource their information security 
operations to Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), which offer prevention and detection services 
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(Cezar et al. 2013), in particular, the actual costs incurred and the savings of outsourcing have to be thor-
oughly considered (Ang and Straub 1998) which might be one reason why Gordon et al. (2005) noted that 
information security is rarely outsourced. 
Overall, there are only few studies that deal with factors that influence information security investment 
decisions in general and their interdependencies. These studies view information security investment from 
a static point of view and do not consider learning strategies and their impact after several iterations. There-
fore we propose the following research question:  
Research Question 1: Which governing variables at the national, industry and firm level affect security 
investment strategies in terms of sequences of investment actions? 
Effects of Action Strategies on Consequences 
Investments in IT security resources, technological or human, have an impact on non-security IT resources, 
complementary organizational resources, processes and performances. Investments in technological IT se-
curity resources, such as biometrical authentication systems, have an impact on non-security IT resources, 
such as data and hardware, as it prevents unauthorized access to a firm’s premises (Boukhonine et al. 2005; 
Liu and Silverman 2001). As a significant number of security incidents are caused by human, not by tech-
nical failures or intruders (Beautement et al. 2009), the impact of investments in human IT resources must 
not be neglected: Human IT security resources, such as workshops or training on information security, 
influence non-security resources through an increased security awareness of employees (Corriss 2010; 
Stephanou 2009).   
Moreover, investing in IT security resources can affect security processes, for example, with the investment 
in a biometric authentication system, a process is installed which safeguards the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability (Khansa and Liginlal 2009). 
A “good” security process (Weishäupl et al. 2015) must be reexamined continually (Kanungo 2006) and it 
can be regarded as a cycle that implements regular checks of the security levels with respect to the firm’s 
guidelines and policies (Steinklauber 2003), i.e., a “good” security process needs to be adapted according 
to changing circumstances over time. The soundness of this adaption depends on the learning policy the 
firm chooses: single or double loop learning. From the indications of Steinklauber (2003), we can conclude 
that security processes should be evaluated through double loop learning but he does not give any concrete 
recommendations for implementation which leads us to the following research questions:  
Research Question 2a: How does the investments in IT security resources influence non-security re-
sources and security processes over time with changing environmental factors?    
Research Question 2b: Depending on the learning technique, how does the relationship between action 
strategies and consequences evolve over time? 
Effects of the Security Processes on the Business Processes 
According to Jakoubi, Neubauer, et al. (2009, p. 26), the “uninterrupted, efficient and effective running of 
business processes is one of the central components for successful business”. With the rising number of 
security threats, security processes, which guarantee the proper operation of business processes, are to be 
discussed by organizations. Jakoubi, Neubauer, et al. (2009) regard the security of business processes from 
a risk-management point of view and propose a roadmap for risk-aware business process management. 
Jakoubi, Tjoa, et al. (2009), examine scientific research efforts in the field of security and risk related busi-
ness process/workflow management and provide a representative overview of the efforts in this field. 
Jakoubi, Tjoa, et al. (2009) conclude that the research on securing business processes is still a very young 
field but has a lot of potential. However, securing business processes through security processes has not 
been addressed in literature at all.  
Overall, we can state that the impacts of security processes on business processes are not sufficiently cov-
ered by the literature, which gives rise to the following research question:  
Research Question 3: How do security processes influence business processes and how is this influence 
mediated by the firm’s learning strategy (single or double loop learning)? 
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Effects of Security Processes on Security Process Performance 
The efficiency of security processes can be measured with a security process performance, for example the 
effectiveness of an authentication process can be quantified through the number of true/false or posi-
tive/negative authentication attempts (Weishäupl et al. 2015). Such a security process performance could 
be useful to compare alternative security processes to evaluate information security investments. Apart 
from the example provided above, we could not find any security process performance measures in the 
literature.   
Since the literature does not discuss any security process performance measures, we formulate the following 
research question:  
Research Question 4: How can the security process performance be measured and how can firms use 
this measurement for future information security investment decisions? 
Effects of Security Process Performances on Business Process Performances 
We hypothesize that, since security processes influence business processes, there is also an impact between 
security process performance and business process performance (Weishäupl et al. 2015). But we did not 
find any literature that deals with this impact.  
Due to the scarcity of literature, we formulate the following research questions:  
Research Question 5a: How do security process performances affect business process performances? 
Research Question 5b: What and how (single or double loop learning) can firms learn from past process 
performance to achieve a higher security level? 
Effects of IT Business Value on Organizational Performance 
The organizational performance, including productivity, market value, competitive advantage and effi-
ciency (Melville et al. 2004), is substantially influenced by security and business process performance. Since 
security processes protect business processes, the security and business process performance and the or-
ganizational performance are directly interrelated in the sense that the better the security process, the 
higher the organizational performance.  
It is not yet analyzed in the literature how the security process performance affects the overall firm perfor-
mance. Furthermore, it remains unclear how the organizational performance is influenced by the firm’s 
learning strategy (single or double loop learning) over time. Therefore, we propose the following research 
questions:  
Research Question 6a: What impact does security process performance have on the organizational per-
formance? 
Research Question 6b: How is this relationship impacted by the firm’s learning strategy (single or dou-
ble loop learning)? 
Single Loop Learning 
The evaluation of information security investments through single loop learning is the “more routine” way 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2000, p. 786). Single loop learning occurs, for instance, when a firm reacts to mis-
takes by correcting them without questioning current governing variables, such as policies and objectives. 
In the literature on information security investments, the concept of learning is present: There are studies 
dealing with single loop learning of attackers: for example, Gupta et al. (2011) state that attackers learn 
from their past errors and find new ways to exploit vulnerabilities. As attackers learn, firms need to adapt 
to circumstances. However, single loop learning of organizations which learn from past investment deci-
sions or mistakes has not been covered exhaustively. We identified only a few approaches that focus on this 
issue: Franqueira et al. (2010) propose a method for investment decision making with a learning cycle that 
stepwise raises the understanding of the investment alternatives from past actions. The study of Khansa 
and Liginlal (2009) concludes that learning from past actions through flexible security process innovation 
investment permits an organization to switch to more cost-effective technologies and achieve better future 
protection from attackers at lower cost. 
Single loop learning from past actions is crucial for a firm and its development to adapt and apply new 
action strategies which may lead to improved consequences. However, the academic literature does not 
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provide guidelines on when and how single loop learning should take place and how it may improve the 
consequences. We thus propose the following research question for future research: 
Research Question 7: How should single loop learning from past actions be designed and what is its 
impact on future security investment decisions after several iterations of learning loops?  
Double Loop Learning 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2000), double loop learning is the more radical way of learning com-
pared to single loop learning because it questions not only the action strategy but also the governing varia-
bles. This perspective is rarely addressed in the literature and, if at all, remarked in a few studies indirectly. 
For instance, Hamdan (2013) mentions double loop learning as part of five major capabilities for future 
readiness. In the study of Shi and Wen (2012), double loop learning is indirectly addressed in their proposed 
value based risk assessment framework. J. Wang et al. (2008) propose a Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach 
which helps to quantify the risk of information security and can determine proper security solutions based 
on its risk preference and thus gives insights to learn from the past: The authors state that with the proposed 
VaR approach, the firm can find out whether extreme daily losses are influenced by environmental factors 
and therefore make strategic investment in information security more effective.  
Although double loop learning is framed as the more effective learning technique compared to single loop 
learning in academic literature, there might be cases in which single loop learning can be preferred. For 
instance, since governing variables are considered, using double loop learning might be more time consum-
ing than single loop learning. Furthermore, establishing double loop learning might lead to higher costs. 
Therefore, it is essential that future research’s attention is drawn on double loop learning which is why we 
propose the following research questions:  
Research Question 8a: What are the financial and security-related incentives to establish double loop 
learning instead of single loop learning?  
Research Question 8b: How do security-related consequences improve over time when firms continue 
using double loop learning? 
Discussion  
Our synthesis of the body of knowledge on information security investments and the identification of re-
search gaps was driven by and organized along a new theoretical model for information security invest-
ments (cf. Figure 3). This model is based on the integrative application of the Resource-based View and the 
Organizational Learning Theory. While it is the combination of both perspectives that allowed us to derive 
the research questions, each of the questions has one or, in some cases, even two prevalent theories on 
which it relies and which we recommend as a basis for future research. For example, financial and security-
related incentives for double loop learning are largely based on concepts of the Organizational Learning 
Theory, the measurement of security process performance to drive firms’ information security investment 
decisions is mainly based on the Resource-based View, and the influence of security processes on business 
processes mediated by a firm’s learning strategy requires both the Resource-based View and the Organiza-
tional Learning Theory (cf. Table 4). 
Answering the identified research questions and addressing related gaps has not only academic relevance 
but also managerial implications. Table 4 provides examples of how managers would benefit from answer-
ing the research questions, hereby the Resource-based View is referred to as RBV and Organizational Learn-
ing Theory as OLT respectively.  
 
Table 4: Research Guidelines and Managerial Implications 
 
Research Gap 
Recom-
mended Theo-
ries in Future 
Research 
 
Managerial Implications 
1. Effects of Govern-
ing Variables on se-
curity investment 
strategies 
OLT+RBV Banks need to comply with regulatory constraints, such as Ba-
sel III and PCIDSS, which require them to invest in security 
countermeasures. Understanding the security-related effects 
of regulatory constraints helps banks to identify and to focus 
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on those investments in IT security resources which support 
compliance with all regulations.  
2a. Influence of in-
vestment in IT Se-
curity Resources on 
Security Processes 
and Non-Security 
Resources over time 
in a changing envi-
ronment 
OLT+RBV For instance, a chemistry laboratory needs to protect sensitive 
research data and knowledge by, for instance, investing into 
biometric authentication systems which protect non-security 
resources such as the laboratory’s premises. The laboratory 
should adapt this biometric authentication system to changing 
environmental factors, such as growing risks of attacks, to be 
optimally protected from future physical break-ins (e.g. to pre-
vent from robbery or terroristic attack).   
2b. Evolution of the 
relationship be-
tween Action Strat-
egies and Conse-
quences 
OLT Consider an automobile manufacturer which applies a bio-
metric authentication system in a security process. If there is a 
change in one of the governing variables (environment), as, for 
instance, a law is adopted that requires strict conditions for bi-
ometric systems due to privacy issues (e.g., fingerprints are not 
allowed for further processing), a single loop learning strategy 
of the firm might lead to financial penalties and reputational 
harm because the firm could be sued by employees. Adopting 
a double loop learning strategy would have prevented this be-
cause a firm could have changed its authentication system. 
3. Influence of Se-
curity Processes on 
Business Processes 
mediated by firm’s 
learning strategy  
OLT+RBV The introduced biometric authentication system directly influ-
ences the business process by preventing unauthorized access 
to an organization’s premises where sensitive data is stored. 
Thereby the system may assure an uninterrupted business 
process. The firm’s reaction to a considerably high false rejec-
tion rate of the biometric authentication system, when pursu-
ing a single loop learning strategy, is to invest into an authen-
tication system which is functionally different from the exist-
ing one (e.g., change from fingerprint to iris scanner).  
4. Measurement of 
Security Process 
Performance to 
drive firms’ infor-
mation security in-
vestment decisions 
RBV The rate of false acceptances in an authentication system can 
be used to evaluate the accuracy of the system. If the accuracy 
is rather poor, the firm might consider additional investments 
in its authentication system. 
5a.  Effect of Secu-
rity Process Perfor-
mance on Business 
Process Perfor-
mance 
RBV 
 
If the authentication system is set too restrictive, many em-
ployees will be mistakenly blocked when trying to get access to 
the premises of the firm. As a consequence, workflows become 
interrupted, which directly relates to a decline of the business 
process performance. 
5b. Learning effects 
from past process 
performance 
OLT+RBV Consider a healthcare provider whose patient data (e.g., per-
sonal information of patients) have been exploited by an at-
tacker. This incident leads to a decrease of patients’ trust in the 
healthcare industry. When adopting a double learning strat-
egy, the healthcare provider considers the decrease of trust by 
investing in a (more) secure authentication system which pro-
vides a better security process performance.   
6a. Relationship be-
tween Security Pro-
cess Performance 
and Organizational 
Performance 
RBV 
 
 
The authentication system’s false rejection of an employee of a 
research institute due to non-acceptance of his fingerprint de-
nies the employee access to the building hindering him from 
work and from being productive. The firm's efficiency and pro-
gress is impacted negatively in the sense that deadlines may be 
missed or daily workload may not be achieved. 
6b. Influence of a 
firm’s learning 
OLT+RBV When considering the double loop learning strategy, the au-
thentication system has to be interoperable with the current 
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strategy on this re-
lationship 
authentication system of its trading partners so that the trad-
ing partners also have access to systems of the focal firm. This 
may lead to a more secure transaction of sensitive data and a 
continuous cooperative workflow that leads into a higher over-
all company revenue.   
7. Impact on future 
security investment 
decisions after sev-
eral iterations when 
using Single Loop 
Learning 
OLT+RBV Since employees unintendedly cause many security incidents, 
organizations invest in security trainings. If the security train-
ing results in fewer security incidents or break downs, the firm 
would learn to establish workshops for employees on a regular 
basis.  
8a. Financial and 
security-related in-
centives for Double 
Loop Learning  
OLT 
 
Questioning the governing variables, e.g., education of the 
country’s population and firm’s employees can help firms to 
invest more efficiently in security workshops or trainings to 
prevent security incidents caused by employees’ improper be-
havior. 
8b. Improvement of 
security-related 
consequences over 
time when using 
Double Loop Learn-
ing  
OLT When adopting the frequency and content of security work-
shops to current governing variables, such as education or cul-
ture of the employees, unintended security incidents and 
breaches caused by employees should decrease over time 
since, for instance, dealing with firewalls is intelligibly pre-
sented to employees.  
 
Conclusion 
We developed a new theoretical model on information security investments by drawing on two established 
IS theories: the Resource-based View and the Organizational Learning Theory. Based on this integrative 
model, we synthesized the information security investment literature adopting a multi-theoretical perspec-
tive. It also allowed us to identify research gaps and to derive research questions which would otherwise 
have remained unidentified. We discussed implications for practice that follow from answering the identi-
fied research questions. 
However, our analysis is not without limitations: Although we followed a structured and accurate search 
process to identify articles, we may have missed some relevant paper. Further, we could only conduct a 
representative citation due to space limitation, even though our search for articles was exhaustive.  
In summary, a firm’s ability to learn from past actions or mistakes is not covered sufficiently in the academic 
information security literature. Answering the derived research questions from the integrative model of 
information security investments might not only guide future research but also has managerial implications 
which help firms to make information security investment decisions. We therefore hope that our literature 
review inspires researchers to contribute innovative and rigorous findings to the existing body of 
knowledge. 
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